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In CDPR’s Development Viewpoint #2, we projected until 
2015 the impact on the global economy of rising oil prices, a falling dollar 
and a U.S. recession, and then the additional effect of the monetary and 
fiscal stimulus that the U.S. Government implemented in response to the 
crisis. In the process, we discovered that the long-term prospects of the U.S. 
economy were projected to worsen after 2015. 
So, for our current modelling, we: 1) project outcomes for 2020 instead 
of 2015 and 2) assume a sizeable yearly U.S. fiscal stimulus for 2008-2011 
instead of just 2008. The total stimulus package—which amounts to 0.5 
per cent of GDP each year in tax cuts, additional expenditures and credit 
incentives for private investment—should help the U.S. economy not only 
escape a severe recession but also fare better over the long term than 
originally projected.
Our focus in this Development Viewpoint is the resultant impact of such a 
scenario on the U.S. economy itself and on three large emerging economies, 
Brazil, China and India. Note that we hold constant, for now, the policy 
stance of these three countries.
We find that U.S. income per capita would begin falling after 2013, as the 
impact of our assumed four-year fiscal stimulus wore off. During the whole 
period 2008-2020, the projected growth of U.S. income per capita is only 0.5 
per cent per annum, well below that of most other developed economies. If 
our assumed stimulus had not been applied, the projected outcome would 
have been much worse.
Why the U.S. Decline?
The principal determinants of U.S. decline are deep-seated structural 
problems, such as the persistence of a large current account deficit and an 
onerous external indebtedness. Despite the slowdown in U.S. growth, its 
current account deficit is projected to rise from -5.5 per cent of GDP in 2008 
to -6.3 per cent in 2020. 
We make the critical assumption that dollar devaluation—which could play 
a supplementary role to fiscal policy—would cease in 2010. This would be 
necessary, we conclude, to contain mounting inflationary pressures (due to 
persistently high fuel and food prices) as well as mounting debt problems.
In contrast to U.S. stagnation and decline, China’s income per capita is 
projected to grow by 4.7 per cent per annum during 2008-2020. This is 
a marked slowdown from its recent trend rate of growth of 7-8 per cent, 
but still high compared to the projected rates of other developing and 
developed countries. 
Because of the global slowdown, especially U.S. stagnation, China’s 
substantial current account surplus in 2008, namely, 6.8 per cent of GDP, 
would be cut by a full three percentage points by 2020. And it would face 
further challenges after 2020 from its increasing imports of manufactures, 
raw materials and high-cost energy. 
India is projected to continue its current momentum of four per cent growth 
of per capita income through 2020 despite the global slowdown. Since it is 
less dependent than China on imports, its current account would noticeably 
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improve, progressing from a deficit of -2.4 per cent in 2008 to a small surplus 
of 0.5 per cent in 2020. This would be based on growing service income and 
increasing exports of manufactures.
Brazil’s per capita income is slated to grow by a somewhat slower, but still 
credible, 3.4 per cent. It would benefit from sustained demand for its commodity 
exports and increased intra-regional trade and investment. But its conservative 
financial policies, which prop up the value of its currency, imply that its small 
current account deficit (i.e., a negative 0.3-0.4 per cent of GDP) would change 
little by 2020.
Global Realignment
Given the growth trends of all developed and developing countries, we project 
that by 2020 there would be a major realignment of the global economy, with 
the United States sinking significantly in importance and the three emerging 
economies assuming greater prominence. 
In 2008, the size of China’s economy (measured in purchasing power parity 
terms) was about 86 per cent of the U.S. economy’s. By 2020, the corresponding 
percentage would be about 132 per cent (see Figure). Thus, China’s economy 
would be the largest in the world, its size surpassing handily both those of the 
U.S. and Western Europe.
India’s economy would enlarge from about 35 per cent of the U.S. economy in 
2008 to about 55 per cent in 2020, and surpass the size of Japan’s economy by 
about 45 per cent. From a much smaller starting point, Brazil would also acquire 
significantly more economic weight. For example, its economy would be about 
38 per cent larger than Eastern Europe’s total economy and be approaching one 
fifth of the U.S economy.
These results suggest that there would likely be seismic economic and 
political changes by 2020. These dynamics would be even more dramatic 
if the economic policies of China, India and Brazil were adjusted in order to 
enhance their long-term development prospects. This a topic to address in 
future papers.
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